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Abstract—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research 
(AirSTAR) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is a facility 
developed to study the flight dynamics of vehicles in emergency 
conditions, in support of aviation safety research. The system was 
upgraded to have its operational range significantly expanded, 
going beyond the line of sight of a ground-based pilot. A redesign 
of the airborne flight hardware was undertaken, as well as 
significant changes to the software base, in order to provide 
appropriate autonomous behavior in response to a number of 
potential failures and hazards. Ground hardware and system 
monitors were also upgraded to include redundant 
communication links, including ADS-B based position displays 
and an independent flight termination system. The design 
included both custom and commercially available avionics, 
combined to allow flexibility in flight experiment design while 
still benefiting from tested configurations in reversionary flight 
modes. A similar hierarchy was employed in the software 
architecture, to allow research codes to be tested, with a fallback 
to more thoroughly validated flight controls. As a remotely 
piloted facility, ground systems were also developed to ensure the 
flight modes and system state were communicated to ground 
operations personnel in real-time. Presented in this paper is a 
general overview of the concept of operations for beyond visual 
range flight, and a detailed review of the airborne hardware and 
software design. This discussion is held in the context of the 
safety and procedural requirements that drove many of the 
design decisions for the AirSTAR UAS Beyond Visual Range 
capability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we discuss the hardware design and 
implementation of the airborne avionics system of a new 
Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability for the NASA 
Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research (AirSTAR) 
project. This was the first unmanned aerial system (UAS) 
designed at NASA Langley Research Center to utilize single-
pilot operation beyond the visual range of a safety observer or 
pilot. The focus of the text is on the airborne avionics design 
and the drivers for decisions that drove that design, including 
future research needs, flight efficiency, and flight range safety 
concerns and geography. Brief asides into the history of the 
project, evolving concepts of operations, and the changes made 
to them are taken to place the work into the context of the 
overall design space and operational restrictions levied on the 
work. A discussion of the ground hardware and associated 
systems are not included here, but detailed descriptions of this 
part of the project work as well as an extensive discussion of 
the final concept of operations can be found in other 
publications [1]. 
II. AIRSTAR HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT 
The NASA AirSTAR project began as an element of the 
NASA Aviation Safety Program’s Vehicle Safety Technologies 
Project. At its core, AirSTAR was meant to provide UAS 
platforms for the testing of experimental flight control laws and 
vehicle dynamics research on aircraft configurations currently 
and actively in use for civil transport applications [2]. 
Representative sub-scale models of existing aircraft were used 
to test new flight control laws and flight dynamic 
characterizations in areas of the flight envelope too risky for 
full-scale aircraft. Initial work built the project capability up to 
flying General Transport Models with a traditional tail 
configuration. 
The AirSTAR UAS was built through a phased approach by 
adding complexity and functionality at every phase-upgrade of 
the system. This approach was taken since at the time of the 
project’s conception, AirSTAR was one of the first large UAS 
projects undertaken at NASA Langley Research Center. In 
addition to the technical challenges to be solved, procedural, 
managerial, and safety issues were also addressed during this 
build-up, both at the project and Center levels of management.  
Table 1 illustrates the key functional elements of the system 
and how they changed through the phased build-up to BVR 
Phase-V. 
As illustrated by Table 1, capabilities were added up until 
Phase-IV [3], at which point an exhaustive flight schedule was 
undertaken to utilize the system for more than fifty research 
flights. 
TABLE I.  AIRSTAR PHASED BUILD-UP 
Element P-I P-II P-III P-IV P-V 
External Pilot X X X X  
Dynamically Scaled Vehicle    X  
Data System  X X X X 
Mobile Operations Station   X X X 
Internal Pilot    X X 
Beyond Visual Range Ops     X 
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The Phase-IV system served this research well, but it had 
certain fundamental limitations to increasing research 
efficiency due to its concept of operations. When moving to 
Phase-V, the decision was made to conduct initial system 
testing using a surrogate aircraft rather than the expensive and 
more difficult to fly dynamically scaled, turbine powered 
vehicles used for the research in Phase-IV. Hence, the 
dynamically scaled aspect of the project was dropped for 
Beyond Visual Range operational development.  
III. AIRSTAR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The AirSTAR Phase-IV Concept of Operations is 
illustrated in Figure 1. The system utilized two pilots 
throughout a research flight. An external safety pilot was 
utilized on the flight line for take-off and landing operations. 
This pilot used a traditional RC transmitter to operate the 
aircraft from a third-person perspective. After take-off the 
external pilot would hand-off the aircraft to the Research Pilot 
located in the cockpit of the Mobile Operations Station (MOS) 
who would then operate the aircraft for the duration of the 
research from his first-person cockpit perspective. The external 
safety pilot also acted as pilot-in-command and was able to 
override control at any time during a flight in the event of the 
Research Pilot losing control or situational awareness of the 
aircraft itself. In normal operation, the external pilot would re-
establish control of the aircraft after research was complete and 
land the aircraft on the runway. 
  The external safety pilot being designated as pilot-in-
command gave him final piloting authority of the aircraft and 
was central to the safety and range containment strategy of the 
Phase-IV system design. This created some fundamental 
limitations on the system’s capability, not the least of which 
was the restriction on the operable airspace range resulting 
from this strategy. The aircraft had to remain within visual 
range of the external pilot at all times, and this requirement 
restricted flight range to about a half nautical mile distance at 
an altitude of 1,200 ft. This flight range size forced the aircraft 
into fairly tight racetrack or figure-eight flight patterns, and 
therefore a large amount of both time and personnel attention 
during a flight was spent monitoring range boundaries and 
making turns to remain within hazard boundaries. Since the 
majority of research tests could only be conducted during the 
twenty second straight legs of the flight patterns, research 
selected for test was restricted to that which could fit in those 
windows, and even then test points would often be repeated if 
they weren’t completed prior to a turn having to be executed. 
Obviously, this affected both research selection and the 
research efficiency of the system.   
AirSTAR Phase-V BVR was developed to lift these 
limitations and provide greater research efficiency through the 
expansion of the airspace range. The targeted expanded 
airspace is approximately 10 nautical miles from the MOS with 
a maximum altitude of 15,000 ft. Figure 2 illustrates the 
concept of operations for AirSTAR Phase-V. The basic 
difference from Phase-IV is the removal of the external pilot 
leaving the ground station research pilot as the only pilot 
necessary to operate the aircraft through all three phases of 
flight. Flight prep is conducted by personnel outside on the 
taxiway, and pre-flight checks are conducted over audio and 
video communication channels utilizing voice and hand 
prompts. The pilot communicates with the air traffic control 
tower as if he were operating a full-scale manned aircraft, taxis 
to the runway, and takes off utilizing both synthetic video 
views and tail-camera video feedback. Once in the air, all 
airspace control is conducted through the air traffic control 
tower in the same manner as a manned aircraft with the notable 
exception that a Range Safety Officer (RSO) is monitoring 
aircraft position in the event he or she must make the call for 
flight termination. This new paradigm simplifies the piloting 
scheme of the aircraft, but new safety systems were required to 
meet the safety and range containment requirements that were 
left open by the removal of the external pilot. 
IV. WALLOPS FLIGHT FACILITY AIRSPACE 
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center’s Wallops Flight 
Facility (WFF) was chosen as the flight range for the initial 
operation of the BVR system. Since neither NASA Langley nor 
Wallops had operated such a system locally, a great deal of 
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design collaboration was conducted between the project team 
at Langley and the team at Wallops. The decision was made to 
operate from the main runway complex rather than the smaller 
unmanned aerial vehicle runway that was available. The main 
driver for this was the extended length and width of the full 
size runway to make landing the aircraft from the internal 
cockpit as simple as possible. The potential for using the 
system on larger and faster aircraft with longer landing and 
take-off distance requirements was also considered in this 
decision. 
  Figure 3 illustrates the final airspace configuration utilized 
at WFF. The red line denotes the hazard boundary within 
which the aircraft must always remain. Waypoints are marked 
to establish standard flight paths for the aircraft during 
operation, and a marker for a lost-link loiter point (LLP) is also 
visible and is utilized in the case of control link failure. The 
hazard area is not uniform, nor does it encompass all of the 
available restricted airspace, and there is one no fly zone within 
the area itself. While the entire hazard area is within restricted 
airspace, WFF and other agencies have a great deal of 
infrastructure present on the ground within the restricted 
airspace area, and in addition there are beaches and other 
potentially inhabited areas scattered along the edges of the 
restricted airspace. As a result, a more restricted flight envelope 
and no-fly zones were established to WFF’s specifications. 
  Not visible in this wider view is the fact that the main 
runway complex is actually not within the restricted airspace. 
Therefore, upon take-off the aircraft is in the National Airspace 
and Certificates of Authorization from the FAA were required 
in order to operate properly. The transition from the runway 
area into the larger restricted airspace requires flying over 
Chincoteague Road, which is the main corridor onto and off of 
Chincoteague Island, VA. As a result, the first flight of the 
system required this road to be closed for the duration of the 
flight, though this was not required for subsequent flight 
operations. 
  These restrictions greatly drove the design of the system 
both in terms of redundancy and the subsystems on board the 
aircraft, as WFF was concerned with having constant valid 
positional data from the aircraft under different failure modes 
and having multiple ways to ground the aircraft in the event of 
an imminent breach of the hazard boundaries. 
 
V. HIGH-LEVEL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Some discussion of the top-level system design, 
encompassing both the aircraft and the ground station is 
necessary to understand how the two interact. The pilot and all 
flight personnel work inside the Mobile Operation Stations 
(MOS), which is the main ground station for controlling the 
AirSTAR vehicle. In the MOS there are stations for 
researchers, hardware and software support personnel, flight 
directors, a cockpit for the pilot, etc. All displays and 
computations done in the MOS are driven by downlink data 
from the aircraft. In total there are four data links 
communicating between the aircraft and the MOS. These are 
the Automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) 
data, the Contingency System-B (aka flight termination) 
controls, the analog video, and the Command and Control 
(C&C) telemetry link transmissions. Each of these links has 
their own transmitter and antenna (or antennas) and are 
therefore separate in order to promote redundancy and keep 
multiple systems from becoming inoperable via a single failure 
mode. 
  The ADS-B and Contingency System B are fundamental 
to the flight contingency system so we reserve discussion of 
them for a separate section. The analog video subsystem 
simply transmits analog video from a tail camera for display 
within the MOS and can act as a backup to the synthetic 
display in the event of a main data downlink telemetry failure. 
In that case it can also serve as a limited means of establishing 
aircraft position based on visual cues. The video system is 
separate from the airborne flight computer and since its main 
function is mainly for use during take-off and landing 
operations, it was designed for its best performance when close 
to the MOS. 
  The main Command and Control (C&C) telemetry link 
carries the data required between the aircraft and the MOS for 
the system to function and is bi-directional. Uplink data 
includes commands for switching between control laws under 
test and input from the cockpit flight inputs. Downlink data 
includes all sensor data, state data of the aircraft, control and 
system monitoring data. Due to the importance of the C&C 
telemetry link is is implemented in hardware via a redundant 
system. 
  Prior to AirSTAR Phase-V BVR operation, the AirSTAR 
system was designed such that the computationally heavy 
calculations were done on the ground, including all flight 
control law execution and other experimental code. The aircraft 
mainly just returned sensor data and fed surface actuators the 
commands sent from the ground computers. However, this 
architecture (where the controls and modeling are not local to 
the sensor data collection) imposed restrictions on the full 
round-trip (ground-to-air-to-ground) latency time of the 
system. Furthermore, in order to have a safe system that could Figure 3: Wallops Flight Facility Operational Hazard Boundaries 
not only remain within hazard boundaries but also present the 
best possible chance to recover from faults, having all of the 
main computation occurring on the ground was not ideal. To 
alleviate some of these constraints the controls and modeling 
algorithms were moved into the airborne flight computer, 
requiring it to now have the power to execute this code in real-
time. Remaining on the ground systems were generation of 
ground displays, caution and warning alerts, and required pilot 
and test interfaces. As a result, the entirety of the airborne 
avionics required a redesign to meet these new computational 
requirements. 
  Figure 4 illustrates the general structure of the top-level 
airborne avionics. The illustrated sensors are not a 
comprehensive list of all available on the aircraft, but are 
instead representative of the bulk of those in the system since 
many are standard analog or serial sensors that are 
commercially available. The four major hardware systems to be 
discussed in relation to this new design are the Flight Computer 
Unit (FCU), the Power Distribution Unit (PDU), the Autopilot, 
and the Flight Termination Receiver. All four play separate 
roles in parts of the system, and they all interact to provide the 
Flight Contingency System functionality required to meet 
range safety requirements. 
  As illustrated there are two channels of communication 
between the FCU and the PDU. One is a uni-directional multi-
channel bundle of pulse-width modulation (PWM) signals for 
servo commands coming from the FCU to the PDU for 
delivery to system actuators. The selection of the source of 
these commands is determined by the state of the Flight 
Contingency System to be discussed later. The other channel 
between the FCU and PDU is used for various status 
monitoring functions via an RS422 connection and some 
general-purpose input/output channels. These monitors include 
the state of the flight termination receiver and the voltage and 
current monitors for the batteries and other subsystems. This 
status information is all placed in the main C&C downlink for 
transmission to the ground for real-time monitoring and display 
to researchers and flight test engineers. 
 
VI. AVIONICS HARDWARE SUBSYSTEMS 
We will now discuss a number of the major subsystem 
components of the airborne avionics system.  These are the 
main flight computer, the power distribution unit, the 
Command and Control Link hardware, and the Flight 
Contingency Systems for range containment. 
A. ASROV Flight Computer 
The Avionics System for Remotely Operated Vehicles 
Flight Computer (ASROV FCU) was procured under a Small 
Business Innovation Research (SBIR) agreement with 
Coherent Technology Services, Inc. (CTSI, Inc.) [4]. It is the 
central computing component in the AirSTAR BVR UAS and 
runs all controls and modeling code on the aircraft. 
  The system is a heterogeneous, dual-processor computing 
platform composed of one single-core x86 processor paired 
with a PowerPC processor within a programmable logic fabric 
that supports the majority of the required peripheral interfaces. 
The form factor of the system is a mixture of PC/104 and 
PC/104-plus boards in an integrated stack. The two-processor 
implementation is integral to how the software is split in order 
to promote safety and resilience of the flight system. The x86 
processor is termed the Research Flight Control Systems 
(ResFCS) and executes all of the controls and modeling code 
under test. Any code that is unproven or subject to in-flight 
failure during the test is run on this processor. The PowerPC 
processor is termed the Primary Flight Control System 
(PriFCS) and runs the stable flight control laws. These stable 
laws are reversionary controls used to fly the aircraft when the 
code-under-test proves unstable or otherwise compromised 
during aircraft operation. The pilot retains full control of 
reverting to this fallback from his control panel in the cockpit 
of the MOS. 
  The programmable logic fabric surrounding the PowerPC 
processor implements peripheral interfaces such as servo 
command signal switching between ASROV-generated signals 
and external autopilot signals, serial interfaces, general purpose 
IO, and digital filtering of analog channels. The analog 
interface of ASROV supports 32 differential analog inputs. The 
most innovative aspect of the analog design is the 
programmable analog digital filter. Parameters for these filters 
can be set on a per-channel basis to tune for specific 
characteristics of the attached sensor. In the AirSTAR system, 
the primary analog sensors are the outside air temperature 
sensor, pressure transducers, angle of attack and sideslip vane 
potentiometers, and the outputs of an analog inertial 
measurement unit used as a supplement to the main inertial 
navigation system unit in the aircraft. 
Figure 4: AirSTAR Beyond Visual Range Airborne Avionics System 
  Serial interfaces supported are standard RS232 and 
RS422. A Data Format Description Language-based (DFDL) 
parsing system makes use of Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) files for message parsing configuration. 
B. Power Distribution Unit 
Figure 5 illustrates the AirSTAR Power Distribution Unit 
(PDU). The first of its two main subsystems is responsible for 
all power switching, regulation, and monitoring. The second 
controls final aircraft actuator command distribution. The 
decision to place both of these functions in the same enclosed 
unit was based primarily on packaging and wiring restrictions 
inside the aircraft. Since the power front-end is stand alone in 
its operation we will discuss it here, and discuss the command 
distribution system later as it relates to the Flight Contingency 
System. 
  The power front-end supports a shore-power source for 
flight line operation, and primary and backup batteries for 
flight operation. Automatic switching from shore power to 
primary battery to backup battery is supported as each input 
voltage source falls outside of its operational threshold. Rather 
than use the backup battery to extend total flight time, it was 
utilized as a contingency fallback in the event of a failed 
primary battery or if unplanned extended flight caused the 
aircraft to use all of the primary battery. Therefore, standard 
operating procedures dictate flight operation on the primary 
battery only and any situation that switches to the backup 
battery is a cause for an immediate return-to-base and landing 
of the aircraft. The battery in use is included in the aircraft’s 
default downlink telemetry for display on the vehicle health 
monitor. 
  Standard voltage and current monitoring functions are 
also supported for all main power inputs and a majority of 
regulated supply rails. This data is communicated back to the 
ASROV FCU via an RS422 serial connection and included in 
the standard downlink telemetry. In addition to allowing real-
time monitoring of power status during flight, review of the 
power data post-flight has been useful in correlating events 
with command data to verify potentially incorrect behavior in 
control laws under test. 
C. Command and Control Link  
The main Command and Control Telemetry Link on the 
aircraft is provided by a pair of commercial off the shelf dual-
band transceivers. These are ethernet-based transceivers that 
provide ethernet gateway capability over the RF link. This 
allows the transceivers on the aircraft to be addressed through 
normal ethernet-based protocols and become part of the MOS 
ethernet network and are addressed as such. User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) communication is used since transmission time 
is critical and the dual transceiver solution lowered the required 
connection reliability of one single transceiver. 
  The primary reason for utilizing two of these transceivers 
is for redundancy. The ASROV FCU utilizes the newest 
received UDP packet from either system regardless of which 
transceiver receives it. This allows uninterrupted data 
transmission when the antenna of one system may be 
obstructed due to the attitude of the aircraft relative to the 
ground antenna.   
D. Flight Contingency System 
Devising a resilient flight contingency system was of the 
utmost importance to the project in order to buy down risk and 
allow access to the airspace required for operation. A two-
level system was devised, consisting of an automatically 
injected failsafe, termed Contingency System-A, paired with a 
manually controlled secondary system, Contingency System-
B. Making proper use of this system requires awareness of 
aircraft position, and therefore there are a total of three 
available position fixes for the aircraft. The primary position is 
provided by the main inertial navigation system on the aircraft 
and is transmitted in the main data on the C&C downlink. 
Secondary position backup is provided by the commercial 
autopilot’s own GPS solution and is also transmitted in the 
C&C downlink data. Finally, in the event of either a double 
failure of the two previous systems or a loss of downlink 
communication with the aircraft, the on-board ADS-B position 
solution is available via a commercial receiver and display. 
The ADS-B system has its own transmission link and is not 
reliant on the main telemetry downlink. Any standard ADS-B 
receiver can see the aircraft and identify it by its FAA-
assigned N-Number. All of these position solutions are there 
to allow the RSO and other ground personnel to make 
informed decisions about when or when not to terminate the 
flight. The actual mechanics of controlling the aircraft in these 
situations is reliant on a PWM path through the flight control 
system. 
Figure 6 illustrates how control signals pass through the 
system and where they are switched at two points in the 
command chain. Both PWM command switches are 
implemented in programmable logic and controlled by outside 
signals (PWM or general purpose IO) and therefore do not 
require either the x86 or PowerPC processors to be operational 
to switch between command signal sources. 
Figure 5: AirSTAR Phase-V Beyond Visual Range PDU 
E. Contingency System – A, Autopilot 
Contingency System-A refers to the commercial-off-the-
shelf autopilot that is interfaced with the ASROV FCU in 
order to form the upstream automatic contingency system. The 
autopilot is programmed so that in the event it takes over 
command of the aircraft it proceeds to a predetermined GPS 
lost-link waypoint and loiters there until either command is re-
established from the ground or fuel is exhausted. Orbiting the 
lost-link point is meant to allow for a standard diagnostic 
procedure to be executed in an attempt to identify and resolve 
the issue if it is something that can be remedied on the ground. 
In case of fuel exhaustion, the autopilot continues circling the 
lost-link waypoint as it descends, ultimately impacting the 
ground within that controlled loiter area. 
The ASROV FCU programmable logic, controlled by a 
PWM from the autopilot itself, switches between either the 
computer’s internally generated servo commands (for 
example, commands generated by a control law under test) or 
the autopilot commands. The commercial autopilot is actually 
being used in a non-standard mode in this system. Usually, a 
dedicated autopilot ground station would be tethered to an RC 
pilot controller and communicate with the autopilot over an 
RF link. However, in the AirSTAR BVR system the telemetry 
link is emulated over an available RS232 port so that the flight 
computer can set the mode of the autopilot to control its 
behavior. There are two main failure modes addressed by 
Contingency System-A. 
 
 Loss of Command and Control Data Telemetry Link 
 
In the event of a loss of data telemetry uplink, which results 
in commands from the ground being disrupted and the 
research pilot losing command, the ASROV FCU senses this 
disruption and instructs the autopilot to execute the relevant 
flight profile which switches the internal PWM switch to the 
autopilot inputs. The executed flight profile is dependent on 
the current state of flight. During up-and-away flight, where 
the aircraft has lifted off and rotated for a heading into the 
restricted airspace, the autopilot flies the aircraft to the lost-
link waypoint. During take-off prior to rotation, the autopilot 
continues straight ahead, lowers altitude and cuts thrust in 
order to land the aircraft.  Since the ASROV FCU is still in 
control of the contingency engagement it is able to more finely 
tailor the response to the phase of flight. An engagement of 
Contingency System-A via link failure results in the lost-link 
waypoint orbit being counter-clockwise.  
 
 ASROV FCU and Autopilot Communication Failure 
 
In the event the communication channel between the 
ASROV FCU and the Autopilot becomes disrupted, either 
through a hardware fault or a software fault, the Autopilot will 
detect this condition and automatically execute the flight 
profile for proceeding to the lost-link waypoint. Again, since 
the PWM switch in the ASROV FCU is implemented in 
programmable logic, the Autopilot can switch itself into the 
command path and command for flight to the loiter point even 
without active serial communication with the ASROV FCU. 
This type of failure results in the lost-link waypoint orbit being 
clockwise. The change in orbit direction allows an immediate 
identification of where to start looking for potential failures of 
the system. This design does present the risk of an autopilot 
failure causing inadvertent autopilot control of the aircraft 
since it controls its own takeover of aircraft command, but this 
was considered a nominal and acceptable risk given the 
amount of safety margin implementing this system allowed.  
Furthermore, such a fault can be disrupted by use of 
Contingency System-B. 
F. Contingency System – B, Flight Termination 
Contingency System-B refers to the commercial-off-the-
shelf Flight Termination System used to implement the last 
ditch contingency system on the aircraft. It consists of the 
receiver on the aircraft, the transmitter on the ground, and the 
PWM command switch in the aircraft PDU. Like all standard 
flight termination systems it uses transmitted “tones” to 
control the receiver and set it in Monitor, Armed, and 
Terminate states, as the relevant switches are thrown on the 
transmitter. The use of the term Contingency System-B for 
this system is mainly a semantic concern, so as not to give the 
impression that it utilizes ordinance and explosives to destroy 
the aircraft. Instead, activation of this system initiates pro-spin 
control positions, resulting in a tight spin to the ground. 
Furthermore, Wallops Flight Facility is a major location for 
rocket launches, which use fully certified FTS systems. As the 
AirSTAR implementation of this hardware does not meet 
those standards and is not required to do so, the terminology 
was changed to minimize confusion. 
Like the PWM command switch in the ASROV FCU, the 
PDU switch is implemented in programmable logic using a 
synthesized VHDL description. The pro-spin control positions 
are hard-coded into the device and require a firmware edit and 
update to change. This aids in configuration management of 
the position definitions across this and any future aircraft to Figure 6: Servo Command Path through the Flight Contingency System 
use the system, though it does add time when a servo or servo 
linkage change is required. Again, the configuration 
management benefits of this design outweighed the 
inconvenience of these firmware updates. 
The PWM command switch itself is controlled by the tone 
monitor outputs from the commercial FTS receiver. The tone 
command outputs were used rather than the command channel 
outputs because they were closer in level to the input voltage 
tolerance of the programmable logic device. In addition, 
utilizing the tone monitors directly can allow the use of a non-
standard switch sequences to trigger the system if it were ever 
deemed necessary. 
In normal operation, Contingency System-A will trigger on 
most software faults and allow for limited during-flight 
diagnosis of telemetry or control issues. Contingency System-
B would be utilized if a double failure occurs where command 
from the ground is lost and Contingency System-A fails to 
take control of the aircraft. 
 
VII. ASROV FLIGHT COMPUTER SOFTWARE 
The software architecture was designed to be as flexible as 
possible in accommodating changes both to the sensor 
components that drove the flight control algorithms, as well as 
to the research code that defined the flight experiment.   To 
allow rapid software development and desktop testing most of 
the code was implemented in Matlab/Simulink, and autocoded 
into C-language modules for use on the real-time processor. 
 Simulink provides an excellent environment for algorithm 
debugging and the construction of test-cases that verify proper 
operation under a variety of emulated input conditions.  This 
nearly eliminated the need for run-time inspection of variables 
on the hardware as the software was developed.  To allow 
flexibility in choice of sensors, the sensor processing code was 
written generically, with most of the sensor configuration done 
in an XML file read by the executable at startup.  This allowed, 
for example, multiple vendors inertial navigation units to be 
supported and changed out without requiring modification to 
the Simulink-based autocode, or a recompile of the flight 
software. 
Each of the sensor subsystems was managed by an 
independent thread on the primary processor, PriFCS, using a 
custom Linux kernel module for the analog inputs and serial 
ports instantiated in the programmable logic.  A single generic 
parser was created which accepted specifications written in 
DFDL, a standard for describing stream messages in XML.  On 
startup the main executive on PriFCS looked for DFDL files 
associated with each serial port, and if found used this 
information to configure a serial stream parser and launch a 
thread to manage that port.  These DFDL-defined threads 
would provide the parsed data message in a specified format 
which was memory mapped into the main loop.  The 
specification included casting to an output data type and 
applying scale and bias conversion.  This allowed the main 
routine, and Simulink-based algorithms, to receive sensor 
inputs in engineering units.  The DFDL specification also 
provided for the identification of a checksum algorithm and its 
application to ensure data integrity.   A set of common 
checksums was built into the software libraries, and custom 
routines could be added.   Even with complex sensors, such as 
the inertial navigation system that provides, accelerations, 
rates, position and orientation information, equipment from 
different vendors could be wired into the system and provide 
the same standardized data to the main real-time loop, with the 
only change being an XML configuration file. 
PriFCS was responsible for timing of the main control loop, 
and its operation was critical to the ability of the pilot to control 
the vehicle.   Most of the computational work was done in a 
routine that was autocoded from Simulink.  For PriFCS this 
algorithm was relatively simple.  It performed stick-to-surface 
mixing, mapping the pilot commands into aero control surface 
displacements.  It also responded to trim inputs, to define a 
stick neutral bias point for each surface.  These trim setting 
were passed into the research control laws to smooth the 
transition when a new control was invoked.   PriFCS would 
pass data to the ResFCS over the Peripheral Component 
Interconnect (PCI) bus and wait for the return commands. If the 
flight mode required communication with ResFCS, and it failed 
to respond within a timeout period, commands would hold last 
value until a pilot input reverted the operation back to PriFCS 
control. This provided a degree of fault tolerance in the 
software being executed on the research processor, which were 
updated more frequently and received less testing than the 
PriFCS code.  
The research processor, ResFCS contained several parallel 
algorithms that could be independently engaged for flight 
evaluation. These included not only different flight control 
laws, but also a variety of triggered test inputs to drive aircraft 
control surfaces for system identification.  The operation of 
code on ResFCS was controlled by mode selection knobs and 
engage switches as part of the pilot input and were all 
implemented as hardware switches in the pilot cockpit. 
Because the system could be operated in several combinations 
of modes it was important to be able to test these in a real-time 
simulation environment.  
For this testing, the ASROV hardware was not used, but 
rather it’s hardware functions were emulated in Simulink, and 
tied to the existing Simulink models for PriFCS and ResFCS 
algorithms. This allowed for piloted simulations that included a 
model of the vehicle dynamics and a visual rendering of the 
flight trajectory. In these piloted simulations it was possible to 
exercise all the complexity in the underlying flight software, 
and if any switches caused signal jumps, filter resets or other 
unanticipated transients it was possible both to see those and to 
determine if the effects on the flight trajectory were acceptable. 
 It was also possible to fail sensor components in the emulation, 
and follow the effects on both the automated system and the 
pilot’s response.    Through a series of these piloted simulations 
many of the failures that were identified as potential hazards 
were realistically emulated and provided evidence that our 
planned mitigations would be sufficient to ensure safety of 
flight.  The previously discussed Contingency System-A and 
Contingency System-B are used to cover cases where the 
reversion to PriFCS control is not adequate or possible. 
VIII. INTEGRATION AND FLIGHT TEST RESULTS 
The airborne system was integrated into and tested in a 
“Bat-4 UAV,” pictured in Figure 7, which was procured from 
then MLB UAV, now known as Martin UAV. It is a push-prop 
aircraft with fixed landing gear, and control surfaces consisting 
of two ailerons, two flaps, and two ruddervators on an inverted 
V-tail. It was primarily chosen as the test platform due to its 
abundance of internal volume for avionics integration and its 
simple flying characteristics, making it ideal for testing the 
system without the taxing workload of taking off and landing 
an already challenging aircraft with new avionics systems. 
  The system was tested over the course of three flights at 
Wallops Flight Facility. The initial flight was a qualification 
flight and was shortened to limit the amount of time 
Chincoteague Road was closed to traffic. The second flight 
suffered a non-fixed GPS solution and the decision to return-to-
base was made and the aircraft landed without incident and the 
issue addressed. This flight, though suffering a hardware 
malfunction, successfully demonstrated the use of the caution 
and warning system to alert the research personnel to the fault 
so they could react accordingly.  The final flight was a one 
hour flight that successfully demonstrated the airspace 
expansion the system was aiming to accomplish. The aircraft 
traveled 6 nautical miles from the MOS at an altitude of 4,000 
feet, limited by battery size and aircraft performance. 
Maneuvers were performed to test the stability of the telemetry 
links on the aircraft, including both the main C&C telemetry 
link and the Contingency System-B link health.  In addition to 
fundamental system checks, this flight also was used for 
airspeed envelope expansion, stall speed identification, air data 
calibration, and system identification technology research [5] 
[6]. 
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